Everything is computerized and on the web nowadays and i’m sure there’s many reasons for it in the power industry and also I’m sure it makes it more efficient too.
Last edited:
Any thought on Russia’s supposed ability to shut down the grid?
- Thread starter WiscWoody
- Start date
-
Active since 1995, Hearth.com is THE place on the internet for free information and advice about wood stoves, pellet stoves and other energy saving equipment.
We strive to provide opinions, articles, discussions and history related to Hearth Products and in a more general sense, energy issues.
We promote the EFFICIENT, RESPONSIBLE, CLEAN and SAFE use of all fuels, whether renewable or fossil.
drz1050
Minister of Fire
Computerized, yes. Access to the internet, no.
Efficiency could be touted as a benefit, but the risks/ cons far outweigh the pros.
I work in a very high tech plant, and while we can remote in and view operations, all operational changes are blocked unless you're at the terminal.
How do they set output of a plant? Is it always run full tilt or do they need to throttle down the boilers at times? I thought that the net allowed producers to monitor the grids and prices that areas are willing to pay for power produced and then a producer can supply that power based on the info relayed by the networks.
drz1050
Minister of Fire
Why can't that be controlled from within the plant walls?
And yes I'm sure they throttle down or up depending on need, but again- why would you want/ need to do any of that remotely?
Analog operation is possible, it doesn't supply as much data for things like maintenance, but it still works together with paper logs.
http://kuow.org/post/russia-hacked-us-power-grid-so-what-will-trump-administration-do-about-it
http://kuow.org/post/russia-hacked-us-power-grid-so-what-will-trump-administration-do-about-it
drz1050
Minister of Fire
I'm not suggesting analog operation, although there's nothing wrong with that either, and in many cases I prefer it.
You can have a digital system completely sealed off from the outside. Power plants are 24/7 operations, so there's always somebody there to handle brown outs/ power throttling and such.
You can have a digital system completely sealed off from the outside. Power plants are 24/7 operations, so there's always somebody there to handle brown outs/ power throttling and such.
I am working on a couple of projects couple of small CHPs being hooked to the grid and going through the interconnect process over the next month or so. There are lot of layers of security imposed on these plants. There are "hard" local protection relays inside the switchgear at the site that are not remotely accessible. They prevent the plants from connecting to the grid if they are out of spec. The only way to change those settings is plugging into the relay at the site. The regional system operator (ISO New England) also has control of the plant to kick if off the grid if they want to. It doesn't shut down the plant it just "islands" it so the facility is on its own. They require a direct T1 copper equivalent circuit into the facility from their central dispatch system. The central dispatch location is a very critical energy facility and in theory has pretty robust protections and NERC regulations are going to ensure that they are following the rules
I also work on occasion at older small biomass power plants, they are much more vulnerable to outside actors. Many have obsolete control systems held together with "bailing wire". Many are running processors from the early PC era. These operations don't have dedicated IT support, its usually one of the techs in the plant keep things running and if they cant figure it out they call a rep (sometimes out of retirement). There are all sorts of add on systems particularly emission control systems that have been retrofit. There is little or no security on the equipment, some are so old that they don't have USB ports. In many cases the control computers have non secure applications on them. These plants are vulnerable to a targeted attack, everyone is different so an enemy would need to target the facility build a custom exploit and then sit it on a shelf until they want to deploy it and hope the system doesn't change. In this case some outsider could trash critical systems in the plant rendering it off line until repaired. Like the CHP plants there is local non remotely accessible protective relaying at the utility interconnection so worse case is the plant drops off the grid but it cant do anything to the grid it connects to.
Newer larger plants I have been in are far more diligent with IT security. Most have an isolated network for the critical plant control systems. There is no outside internet access to the control systems. They have a separate non critical network that has oversight on the plant operations but all they can do is look at an image of the operation data. They still are vulnerable to a Stuxnet type attack but it only works if the control system has a port to the internet. Usually the devil in these systems is that a lot of commercial non critical IT intermediate equipment has lot of extra functionality built into it that may not be secure. Something that should just be dumb switch may have a remotely accessible monitoring and maintenance port so the IT people can remotely address it to save them time. Once installed these devices aren't routinely updated and its possible route into plant.
The bigger issue seems to the actual transmission system that routes power around the regions. There is lot of old archaic gear out there and little incentive for the companies that own it to upgrade it . NERC regs says the equipment needs to be audited and upgraded but the backlog is decades. Some of the facilities are over 100 years old. The design philosophy is pretty simple, if in doubt fail safe and that means the station shuts down. Generally having a transmission line burn up is human decision where an safety is either disabled long ago or someone disables it to try to keep the grid up. Some of these protections can be changed remotely, but its darn poor design to be able to disable hard trips that protect equipment remotely. The problem is when one substation goes down in tight power situation the temptation is to try to keep the grid up and that can lead to cascading trips and the whole grid goes down until someone picks up the pieces. In urban areas it can be dangerous for the grid to go down but there are long term regulations in place that designated emergency facilities need independent power backup. After Hurricane Sandy NY and CT handed out big subsidies to hospitals and other critical demands to put in CHP plants and one thing nice with CHP along with reduced energy costs is that they can be islanded so if the grid goes down they can keep running.
The system was designed for local power plants to generate local power with some interconnects to other regions to borrow power on occasion but not intended for long term transmission of power long distances. This is costly infrastructure to install and politically hard to sell as it means new and expanded transmission corridors through politically sensitive areas. Southern Connecticut was identified as a very unreliable system for years yet political opposition prevented an upgrade of the grid. The final solution was some grid upgrades but mostly installing a lot of local backup generation so when the tenuous regional grid connections failed, the lights wouldn't go out. All of southern New England and particularly Mass is doing the same thing. There is shortfall of 3000 MW from a combination of Vt Yankee, Pilgrim and Brayton Pt in the region all being shut down with no significant replacement generation as the region lacks cheap natural gas capacity. The plan is import power from Hydro Quebec 1000 miles away from the dams over overhead power lines vulnerable to natural events like ice storms and solar flares or deliberate acts like a couple of morons target shooting did a few years back on the existing HQ line. There will be oil fired peakers in theory to back these long lines up but it remains to be seen if they can pick up the load quickly enough.
If some bad actor decides to do large scale grid interruption to the US its effectively an act of war. Its a heck of a lot easier to lob a couple of high altitude nukes and create an EMP if they want to damage the grid long term. The main reason to screw with the grid is its psychological effect, Russia is doing this to Ukraine frequently, its just a not so subtle way of reminding Ukraine who is boss. its a far better threat than an actual strategy.
Buried in this discussion is that there are billions of dollars of upgrades to the grid. Journalists talk to the experts on what could happen and most of those experts stand to make lot of money helping implement fixes. I remember at some point the US went paranoid about chemical weapons and the government recommended everyone go out and buy duct tape and to seal off their houses and buy canned chicken for survival food. I always wonder how much of that was political gift to the duct tape manufacturers and companies like Tyson foods?
I also work on occasion at older small biomass power plants, they are much more vulnerable to outside actors. Many have obsolete control systems held together with "bailing wire". Many are running processors from the early PC era. These operations don't have dedicated IT support, its usually one of the techs in the plant keep things running and if they cant figure it out they call a rep (sometimes out of retirement). There are all sorts of add on systems particularly emission control systems that have been retrofit. There is little or no security on the equipment, some are so old that they don't have USB ports. In many cases the control computers have non secure applications on them. These plants are vulnerable to a targeted attack, everyone is different so an enemy would need to target the facility build a custom exploit and then sit it on a shelf until they want to deploy it and hope the system doesn't change. In this case some outsider could trash critical systems in the plant rendering it off line until repaired. Like the CHP plants there is local non remotely accessible protective relaying at the utility interconnection so worse case is the plant drops off the grid but it cant do anything to the grid it connects to.
Newer larger plants I have been in are far more diligent with IT security. Most have an isolated network for the critical plant control systems. There is no outside internet access to the control systems. They have a separate non critical network that has oversight on the plant operations but all they can do is look at an image of the operation data. They still are vulnerable to a Stuxnet type attack but it only works if the control system has a port to the internet. Usually the devil in these systems is that a lot of commercial non critical IT intermediate equipment has lot of extra functionality built into it that may not be secure. Something that should just be dumb switch may have a remotely accessible monitoring and maintenance port so the IT people can remotely address it to save them time. Once installed these devices aren't routinely updated and its possible route into plant.
The bigger issue seems to the actual transmission system that routes power around the regions. There is lot of old archaic gear out there and little incentive for the companies that own it to upgrade it . NERC regs says the equipment needs to be audited and upgraded but the backlog is decades. Some of the facilities are over 100 years old. The design philosophy is pretty simple, if in doubt fail safe and that means the station shuts down. Generally having a transmission line burn up is human decision where an safety is either disabled long ago or someone disables it to try to keep the grid up. Some of these protections can be changed remotely, but its darn poor design to be able to disable hard trips that protect equipment remotely. The problem is when one substation goes down in tight power situation the temptation is to try to keep the grid up and that can lead to cascading trips and the whole grid goes down until someone picks up the pieces. In urban areas it can be dangerous for the grid to go down but there are long term regulations in place that designated emergency facilities need independent power backup. After Hurricane Sandy NY and CT handed out big subsidies to hospitals and other critical demands to put in CHP plants and one thing nice with CHP along with reduced energy costs is that they can be islanded so if the grid goes down they can keep running.
The system was designed for local power plants to generate local power with some interconnects to other regions to borrow power on occasion but not intended for long term transmission of power long distances. This is costly infrastructure to install and politically hard to sell as it means new and expanded transmission corridors through politically sensitive areas. Southern Connecticut was identified as a very unreliable system for years yet political opposition prevented an upgrade of the grid. The final solution was some grid upgrades but mostly installing a lot of local backup generation so when the tenuous regional grid connections failed, the lights wouldn't go out. All of southern New England and particularly Mass is doing the same thing. There is shortfall of 3000 MW from a combination of Vt Yankee, Pilgrim and Brayton Pt in the region all being shut down with no significant replacement generation as the region lacks cheap natural gas capacity. The plan is import power from Hydro Quebec 1000 miles away from the dams over overhead power lines vulnerable to natural events like ice storms and solar flares or deliberate acts like a couple of morons target shooting did a few years back on the existing HQ line. There will be oil fired peakers in theory to back these long lines up but it remains to be seen if they can pick up the load quickly enough.
If some bad actor decides to do large scale grid interruption to the US its effectively an act of war. Its a heck of a lot easier to lob a couple of high altitude nukes and create an EMP if they want to damage the grid long term. The main reason to screw with the grid is its psychological effect, Russia is doing this to Ukraine frequently, its just a not so subtle way of reminding Ukraine who is boss. its a far better threat than an actual strategy.
Buried in this discussion is that there are billions of dollars of upgrades to the grid. Journalists talk to the experts on what could happen and most of those experts stand to make lot of money helping implement fixes. I remember at some point the US went paranoid about chemical weapons and the government recommended everyone go out and buy duct tape and to seal off their houses and buy canned chicken for survival food. I always wonder how much of that was political gift to the duct tape manufacturers and companies like Tyson foods?
Last edited:
